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Abstract
In 2010, the Brazilian Antitrust Authority -CADE- concluded  an agreeement with Globo 
and the “Club of 13” on a three-year deal for the exclusive broadcasting rights to all 
Brazilian Football  League (BFL) games spanning the five principal media platforms:  free-
to-air TV, pay TV, Pay per View, Internet and Mobile. The deal eliminates competition in 
broadcasting of Brazilian League games (primarily other networks, including Record, SBT, 
ESPN, etc.), reducing “competition in the market.” However, it is plausible to assume 
that exclusivity can bring efficiencies to the market by ensuring a return on investments. 
In addition, the sale of broadcasting rights accounts for nearly 40% of the revenues 
of Brazilian clubs. Banning exclusivity will likely reduce revenues and dampen sector 
efficiency. However, the contract included a preference clause for Globo that adversely 
affected “competition for the market.” Globo abandoned the preference clause under 
the agreement. Another important provision of the agreement was the requirement 
that the Club of 13 auction the five media platforms separately. This article examines the 
economic rationale of the agreement and provides a brief analysis of the main lessons 
arising from the fragmentation of negotiations in 2011.  
Keywords




O Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica – CADE - entrou em acordo com 
a Globo e o chamado “Clube dos 13” em 2010 acerca da exclusividade de três anos 
no contrato de venda de direitos de transmissão dos jogos do campeonato brasileiro, 
englobando as cinco mídias relevantes: TV aberta, TV fechada, Pay per View, Internet 
e Celular.  A prática exclui outros competidores do mercado de transmissão de jogos 
de futebol do campeonato brasileiro (no caso, principalmente, outras emissoras ou 
canais como Record, SBT, ESPN, etc..), comprometendo a “concorrência no mercado”. 
No entanto, é bastante plausível assumir que a prática de exclusividade neste mercado 
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pode ter eficiências ao garantir o retorno de investimentos. Ademais, as receitas gera-
das pela cessão dos direitos de transmissão constituem hoje cerca de 40% das receitas 
dos clubes brasileiros. A remoção da prática de exclusividade pode reduzir os valores 
pagos, além de comprometer a eficiência do setor. De outro lado, o contrato também 
continha “cláusula de preferência” em favor da Globo, mitigando a “concorrência 
pelo mercado”. No acordo, a emissora abriu mão da cláusula de preferência. Outro 
dispositivo importante do acordo foi obrigar o clube dos 13 a leiloar as cinco mídias 
principais separadamente. A ideia do artigo é examinar a racionalidade econômica do 
acordo e uma breve análise das principais lições da fragmentação das negociações que 
acabou por ocorrer em 2011.  
Palavras-Chave
futebol, exclusividade, leilão, transmissão de jogos por televisão
1. Introduction 
The relationship between sports and media is increasingly intertwi-
ned throughout the world, and in Brazil this is no different. As the 
Economist (2010) noted, “TV needs sport as much as sport needs 
TV,” as “the wedding between sports and TV has done both parties ri-
cher.” Boosting the profits of teams and TV requires making viewers 
and advertisers more willing to pay for the product. This requires a 
greater focus on the business aspects of this segment.
Jeanrenaud and Késenne (2006) show that the symbiotic relationship 
between TV and sports is reflected in the fact that revenues from 
broadcasting emerged as the most important revenue source for se-
veral sports. Sports are also key to attracting TV audiences, which 
affects broadcaster competition. Specifically, football is one of the 
world’s major televised sports (with the significant exception of the 
US). According to Jeanrenaud and Késenne (2006), broadcasting 
accounts for 44% and 37% of the revenues of English Premier League 
and Italian Serie A teams, respectively. 
In addition, the authors note that the relationship between broad-
casters, clubs and advertisers has gone so far as to spur rules changes 
in some sports: “the possibility of scoring in each exchange in vol-
leyball, the tie-break in tennis and television timeouts in basketball 
and American football. Equally, organizers have agreed to change the 
competition schedule to accommodate the needs of broadcasters and 
sponsors.”
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Gratton and Solberg (2007) point out that sports in Europe were 
heavily regulated until the 1980s. Therefore, sports were largely 
unattractive to private broadcasters and, as such, mostly televised by 
State-owned networks. Increasing deregulation since the 1990s has 
attracted a number of private broadcasters to the business, leading 
to a substantial rise in the prices of broadcasting rights and greater 
commercial appeal for advertisers. Moreover, a majority of contests 
are now broadcast on Pay TV channels, creating an additional reve-
nue stream directly from viewers. 
In Brazil, the TV sports business has generated more and more mo-
ney for teams. Since the mid-1980s, Brazil’s leading broadcaster, 
Globo, has been the sole broadcaster of the country’s most impor-
tant competition, the Brazilian Football League (BFL).     
In 1997, a complaint was brought before the Secretariat of Economic 
Law (Secretaria de Direito Economico – SDE)1 in connection with 
the broadcasting rights contract in effect, but it was not until 2002 
that a formal proceeding was established. The three principal issues 
of the complaint were: i) the exclusive purchase of the broadcasting 
rights to the BFL by the largest free-to-air TV broadcaster in Brazil, 
Globo; ii) the joint sale of those rights by the biggest Brazilian foot-
ball teams, the “Club of 13,” constituting a cartel; iii) the bundling 
of rights across all five commercial media platforms, free-to-air TV, 
pay TV, pay per view, mobile, and Internet,2 controlled by a single 
player, i.e., Globo. 
After concluding its investigation, SDE called for intervention in the 
market to limit the exclusive deal. SDE proposed that CADE create 
two separate packages for free-to-air TV broadcasting rights.  The 
Secretariat also concluded that the five media platforms should be 
unbundled and sold separately. At the same time, SDE found the 
joint sale of rights by the “Club of 13” to be an efficient tool, recom-
mending against intervention by CADE.  
In October 2010, the Brazilian Competition Agency – CADE3 set-
tled the case a full 13 years after the complaint was first filed. 
1 Economic Law Secretariat  of the Ministry of Justice.
2 In Brazil, there are as of yet no live mobile or Internet broadcasts of games.  Currently, 
these media platforms are employed to replay goals, show highlights, and offer abbreviated 
rebroadcasts of games.
3 Conselho Admnistrativo de Defesa Economica  Economic Defense Administrative Council. 
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The settlement included four points: 1) Globo unilaterally waived 
the “preference clause” for renewal of the 2012-2014 BLC broad-
casting contract. The clause was deemed unreasonably costly to 
“competition for the market” on the five relevant media platforms. 
Furthermore, the “Club of 13” pledged not to reintroduce the pre-
ference clause in future contracts; 2) the “Club of 13”  undertook to 
award the broadcasting rights to the BLC through an auction with 
clear and objective rules; 3) the “Club of 13” committed to  award 
separate contracts for the five relevant media platforms to facilitate 
entry; 4)  the winner of the free-to-air TV auction would be allowed 
to sub-license its broadcasting rights, enabling (sub)licensees to exer-
cise the right to choose  which games to broadcast. CADE agreed 
with SDE that the joint sale of broadcasting rights by the “Club of 
13” was efficient. 
This paper aims to explain the economic elements underlying the 
design of the settlement in view of the international experience and 
the unique features of the Brazilian case. 
2. What is the Antitrust Issue?
The evolution of sports broadcasting illustrates the consolidation of 
a typical two-sided market: advertisers buy TV ad time for games on 
one side to reach viewers on the other side. The bigger the audience, 
the more valuable ad time for advertisers, representing a typical po-
sitive externality from the viewer market to the advertising market. 
Broadcasters constitute the platform through which externalities are 
internalized to maximize the value for both markets. It is unclear 
whether banning exclusivity and expanding the number of broadcas-
ters mediating these two-sided markets contributes to internalizing 
these externalities.  
We examine the impact of exclusive deals on competition in two 
markets, the football broadcasting market and the general broadcas-
ting market. The potential negative impacts of exclusive deals on the 
efficiency of the football broadcasting market is likely to be inter-
nalized by clubs, suggesting that the private decision to adopt this 
particular conduct tends toward the social optimum. For instance, if 
the exclusive broadcaster makes the access of viewers to games very 
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expensive, clubs will not have exposure to their fan base, reducing 
the attractiveness and the value added to the business. 
While there may be a convergence between the private and social 
optimum in the football broadcasting market, this convergence will 
not occur in the general broadcasting market as long as clubs fail to 
give adequate attention to this broader market. While football is not 
an essential facility, it is a powerful tool to attract and maintain au-
dience share not only for football matches, but across the program-
ming grid, heavily influencing competition among broadcasters.4  
Things get even more complicated when we consider that the exclu-
sive deal was negotiated with Brazil’s dominant broadcaster, Globo, 
which holds almost half of all audience share and earns about ¾ of 
advertising revenues in the free to air TV segment in Brazil.5 
That said, the case at hand is not about football broadcasting in ge-
neral, but about broadcasting of BLC games in particular. As such, 
the pertinent question is whether the BLC is important enough to 
have a significant impact on broadcast competition.    
The BLC brings together the country’s biggest and most tradi-
tional teams, with the largest followings, among them Flamengo, 
Fluminense, Corinthians, Santos and Atlético Mineiro. Because 
each game affects every other team’s position in the standings, the 
potential viewing audience extends well beyond state lines and 
the individual fan bases of teams. This is a key advantage of the 
4 According to SDE (2008) - Based on the European Commission Statements -  football helps 
build a positive image of the channel for viewers, consolidating brand loyalty: “If a channel 
usually broadcasts certain programmes, such as the UEFA Champions League, which is in 
itself a strongly branded event, viewers may develop a habit of screening that channel as their 
first port of call in determining their viewing choices. The creation of a brand loyalty to a 
channel encourages viewers to use the channel as “point of reference” for their viewing. This 
has beneficial effects on other programmes broadcat by the channel”. Moreover, as stated by 
Jeanrenaud and Késenne (2006) “along with first run major box-office films, sport forms the 
major premium content that channels use as a means of standing out from their competitors 
and to increase both audience size and subscriber numbers. Sport has a clear advantage over 
films for the advertisers as it attracts a more homogeneuos audience. The viewers are most 
likely to be young, male and affluent. This underlines the importance of exclusivity clauses, 
found in many contracts. In Europe, football rights have been the driving force in the deve-
lopment of pay-TV, and in Britain the acquisition of exclusive rights for live Premier League 
matches was a key element in Sky s´ strategy to dominate the satellite television industry.” 
The significance of football broadcasts for TV programming gives full meaning to televised 
football’s description as a “killer application.”
5 In addition, the leading sports channel on Brazilian pay TV, SportTV, is part of the Globo 
conglomerate.
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BLC over other competitions, notably the Copa do Brasil (Brazilian 
Cup), which involves a significantly smaller pool of teams, the state 
championships, especially Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, and ma-
jor international competitions such as the “Libertadores Cup” and 
the “South American” Cup, in which far fewer Brazilian teams are 
represented.
The BLC runs longer than any other football competition. In 2009, 
for instance, the BLC opened play on May 9 and came to a close 
on December 6, extending almost seven months. The other bro-
acast competitions that year – São Paulo (01/21 -05/03), Rio de 
Janeiro (01/24-05/03), Copa do Brasil (02/18-07/01), Libertadores 
(02/10-07/08) and Sul-Americana (08/26-12/02) – were significan-
tly shorter.6 
The importance of the BLC is reflected in the sums paid by Globo 
to the participating clubs. In 2005, Globo paid more than 3.5 ti-
mes the combined total paid for free-to-air rights to the São Paulo 
State championship, the Copa do Brasil and the South American 
Cup. From 2005 to 2009, the amount paid by Globo for the right 
to broadcast BLC rose more than four times, indicating an increase 
in the economic value of the product. The same trend occurred in 
the pay TV segment. The per game amount paid to clubs more than 
doubled between 2008 and 2009. In sum, in view of the importance 
of the BLC to the Brazilian broadcasting market, the principal an-
titrust issue in this case involves the impact of vertical foreclosure 
conduct on the “exclusive deal” between Globo and the Club of 13 
against competing broadcasters. 
3. Exclusive Deals in Football Broadcasting: Destroying Compe-
tition in the Market or Creating Value?
In the previous section, we saw that the exclusive deal negative-
ly affects short-run competition as long as Globo’s competitors do 
not have access to a key input, football matches. Nevertheless, be-
6 The strong influence of time duration of the sporting event was stressed by Fikentscher 
(2006) when addressing the role of the Olympic games: “To be able to develop a brand image 
for a channel, programming needs to be broadcast throughout the year on a regular basis and 
must attract viewers not only for one or two competitions but for the event as a whole. Sixteen 
days of olympic games is just too short a period to guarantee high viewing levels for long peri-
ods or for the audience to become accustomed to viewing a particular channel”.    
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fore resorting to intervention, the dynamics of competition in the 
market and the potential efficiencies of this conduct must first be 
addressed. 
The fact Globo owns 100% of the relevant market, thus effectively 
eliminating all “competition in the market, does not mean an absen-
ce of vigorous “competition for the market”. It is also possible that 
to ensure healthy “competition for the market,” “competition in the 
market” should be handicapped. The contest between players for a 
more valuable business, as embodied in a three-year exclusivity con-
tract for the broadcasting rights to all the matches of a given football 
competition is likely to produce a more spirited battle in relation to 
a contract spanning a shorter term or encompassing a smaller set of 
broadcasting rights, such as the right to broadcast select matches. 
Competition for the market in this case may also translate into more 
money for clubs, which will tend to loosen their purse strings in 
order to improve their “product.” This may include signing better 
players and/or coaches, enhancing clubs facilities and medical care to 
players, etc. Moreover, broadcasters may roll out additional offerings 
that add economic value to the business, including new broadcasting 
technologies, appropriate scheduling of matches, more relevant infor-
mation to viewers, more camera angles or more favorable treatment 
for club advertisers. Furthermore, competition among broadcasters 
for an exclusive contract may also serve to protect investments by 
avoiding free-rider behavior.7  
To address the trade-offs of competition “in” and “for” the market in 
this segment, we consider the impact of these types of competition 
on i) revenues and/or other advantages offered by broadcasters to 
clubs and; ii) incentives for investments by broadcasters. 
The impact of competition on club revenues is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, when there is no exclusivity, the number of buyers 
of broadcast rights increases, contributing to enhanced revenues. 
However, non-exclusivity reduces the value that each broadcaster 
will be willing to pay clubs. The number of viewers and thus the 
advertising revenues would be split among all broadcasters awar-
ded rights. As long as the expected revenues of the broadcaster in 
7 See the survey on the relationship between exclusive deals and investments in general in 
Whinston (2006, pp. 178-188).
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the two-sided market, viewers and advertisers,  is the determining 
factor of what the broadcaster is willing to pay clubs, the amounts/
advantages offered by each broadcaster would be expected to shrink 
if exclusivity were banned.  Therefore, an increase in the number of 
broadcasters transmitting matches would translate into more buyers, 
each of which would pay less, generating an ambiguous net result. 
As such, it is difficult to establish with certainty which effect pre-
vails, but considering the actual choice of clubs in favor of exclusi-
vity, we can reasonably state that the net effect of exclusivity is to 
enhance the revenues of clubs.
The analysis of the effect of exclusivity on investment depends on 
at least three variables, free-riding on broadcasters s´ investments, 
the incentive of competition on product differentiation and the 
Schumpeterian “profit loss” argument. Free-riding depends on the 
potential externalities generated by competitors’ investments. For 
instance, promotion of the sport of “football,” or the BLC in parti-
cular, by a single broadcaster may benefit all broadcasters, not only 
the investor. Non-exclusivity, however, may lead to underinvestment 
in football or insufficient promotion of the BLC by broadcasters.  
In the case of investments in proprietary technology developed 
by a broadcaster, such as image quality, there is no free-riding. 
The broadcaster may differentiate its product, generating benefits 
accruing only to itself. Competition in the market may enhance the 
rents derived from product differentiation by siphoning off consu-
mers from competitors. Even sunk costs such as specialized cables, 
microphones, software, technologies specific to football cannot be 
free-ridden by other broadcasters. In addition, note that in the case 
of human capital investments such as expert commentators, including 
former star players, the possibility of some free-riding by other bro-
adcasters, which may have “trained” the commentators in question, is 
possible. The free-riding is mitigated to the extent other broadcasters 
will have to offer better salaries to attract the expert commentators. 
For both proprietary and non proprietary technology, there is the 
classical Schumpeterian argument, by which competition in the 
market reduces expected profits, reducing the incentive to invest. 
Therefore, in the case of proprietary investment, the net impact of 
exclusivity is ambiguous. We argue that an inverted “U” relationship 
between the number of players competing in the market, on the one 
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side, and club revenues and broadcaster investments, on the other, 
is a plausible description of the sector. 
It is difficult for regulators to ascertain where the locus of the U 
curve is and how revenues can be maximized. Clubs themselves 
may harbor uncertainty about this relationship, although not to the 
extent regulators do. Given the asymmetry of information between 
regulators and clubs, State intervention mandating a minimum num-
ber of broadcasters may harm competition for the market, which 
may, in fact, carry greater weight than competition in the market. 
Banning exclusivity could deteriorate the property rights of clubs, 
harming the economic value of the business and reducing expected 
club revenues and broadcaster investments. 
The SDE did not propose a mere ban on exclusivity. Rather, it re-
commended imposing a constraint on the freedom of clubs to sell 
broadcasting rights by facilitating competition in the market. The 
SDE put forth a plan to create two free-to-air TV broadcasting 
rights packages.8 The first package would involve games played on 
Wednesdays and Sundays, while the second package was intended 
for matches played on Thursdays and Saturdays. CADE found that 
the risk of this type of intervention in the BFL’s business model, 
specifically the potential reduction in club revenues, was too high.9 
CADE opted for a softer approach. 
A related trade-off considered in this case concerned the choice be-
tween broadcasting games on free-to-air or pay TV. As Gratton and 
Solberg (2007) report, deregulation in Europe led to the migration 
of sports broadcasting from free-to-air to pay TV, translating into a 
significant increase in sports programming on TV. In Brazil, Globo 
8 This approach was inspired by the UEFA Champions League, the German Bundesliga, the 
British Premier League and the American National Football League. The model adopted 
by UEFA, the Bundesliga and the Premier League  stemmed from a previous challenge 
brought by the European Competition Commission. In the case of American Football, the 
sale of broadcasting rights in packages has been accomplished  voluntarily. In fact, the latter 
case provides the basis for the SDE’s argument that the sale of sports broadcasting rights 
in packages adds value to the business. The SDE’s position would indeed find firm footing 
if the Football Association were to choose this model of its own accord. However, it is not 
clear that the value of the business would be bolstered by having the State impose the sale of 
broadcasting rights in packages against the will of the Football Association. For in the end, 
it is unlikely the regulator has better information at hand than the Association to make a 
decision of this nature and magnitude.   
9 The SDE did not recommend any constraint on the ability of a single buyer to purchase the 
two packages, a solution supported by Record. The primary concern was that a constraint of 
this nature could lead to a “buyer cartel” of broadcasters. 
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transmits two games a week on free-to-air TV, or 10% of all BFL 
games held each week. Until just a few years ago live TV broadcasts 
were not available for all games. By contrast, today live telecasts of 
all BFL contests are available, either on free-to-air TV or “pay per 
view,” an achievement Globo attributes to exclusivity.     
 A ban on exclusivity would, in all likelihood, lead to more  free-to-
air TV broadcasters, offering greater access to people who cannot 
afford pay TV. This is significant in a country like Brazil in which 
pay TV subscription rates are only 5.1 per 100 inhabitants, while 
the percentage of households with TVs is over 95%. The bottom 
line is that transmitting more games on free-to-air TV will reduce 
the attractiveness of the most profitable pay TV and pay per view 
packages. At the limit, banning exclusivity could jeopardize pay per 
view and the live broadcast of all matches, eroding the economic 
value of the BFL. CADE, Globo and the Club of 13 agreed that this 
trade-off should not be contemplated in the settlement and that the 
parties should be free to their own strategies for growing the busi-
ness, whether through free-to-air TV or pay TV.10 
 Based on these various considerations, CADE was not willing to ban 
or significantly constrain exclusive deals in connection with football 
broadcasting rights in order to foster competition in the market, 
opting, instead, for a softer approach center on competition for the 
market. 
4. Efficiency of the “Club of 13”  
The European Commission indicated that centralizing the negotia-
tions on the broadcasting rights for individual clubs in a single entity 
such as the Club of 13 could have a negative impact on competition. 
On the other hand, the EU recognized that centralization is a com-
10 Jeanrenaud and Késenne (2006)  defines the trade-off between free-to-air and pay TV  in 
the following terms: On the one hand, the marginal cost of serving an additional viewer is 
zero, making the free-to-air TV model, with zero price to viewers, more  appropriate. On 
the other hand, pay TV has a greater capacity than free-to-air TV to  identify viewer prefe-
rences, allowing for efficient price discrimination and bundling strategies. In this light, the 
authors argue, “given the present state of knowledge, it is not possible to say which of the forms 
of market failure leads to the great welfare loss,” offering, as such, a possible justification for 
opting for neutrality.
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mon practice in the media market and an important instrument for 
boosting club revenues. 
The main problem is that centralizing the process in a single body 
like the Club of 13 reproduces many of the characteristics of a car-
tel. In this case, the problem is not the “unified” price of broad-
casting rights for individual games to a level closer to a monopoly. 
The Club of 13 bundles all BFL matches and sells them for a single 
aggregate price. Therefore, the stability of the “cartel” can be taken 
for granted, as a single price is easier to manage than several prices. 
Because clubs do not set prices or negotiate separately with broad-
casters, there is no opportunity for deviating from the cartel rule.    
On the other hand, classifying the Club of 13 as a typical cartel is to 
disregard the distinctive features of the sector. In contrast to other 
industries, the “product” cannot be produced by a single club. It is 
by definition a “joint production” of at least two clubs, a common 
trademark of sports in general.  
Furthermore, games played outside the bounds of a formal competi-
tion will generally have a lower value than games played within the 
scope of an official league. In other words, the fact that a particular 
contest is part of a championship enhances its economic value. A 
football championship can be understood as a multiplant firm rather 
than a cartel. Each game can be taken as a plant that produces part 
of the total product of the company. According to Gerrard (2006), 
it can be described as “cooperative competition, in which clubs coo-
perate in economic terms to produce championships”. What is being 
sold is competition itself, which is a common feature of professional 
sports.11 
Another feature of this market relates to the important role the 
uncertainty of match results plays in the business.  Individual games 
and championships with highly predictable results jeopardize fan 
interest, even where a particular fan’s team is the odds-on favorite 
to win or emerge as champion. Thus, a competitive balance among 
clubs is essential to  ensure greater uncertainty with respect to re-
sults, attracting more fans to games and generating more advertising 
for clubs and broadcasters. This balance depends on distributing 
11 Tonazzi (2003), as quoted  in Jeanrenaud and Késenne (2006), challenges this view of 
leagues as a single economic unit  arguing that “clubs are separately owned and benefit from 
a large commercial and organizational autonomy.” 
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good players and quality facilities among teams. It is also contingent 
on distributing resources among clubs. The problem is that clubs 
with larger fan bases are able to draw more resources from fans 
(e.g., ticket sales) and advertisers. This provides larger clubs with 
growth opportunities not available to smaller teams, jeopardizing 
competitive balance. 
According to Gratton and Solberg (2007), the joint sale of broad-
casting rights allows at least some redistribution of resources among 
clubs. Even if the larger teams receive a larger proportion of the 
association’s revenues, the smaller teams benefit from the externa-
lities generated by the additional value  the  major clubs bring to the 
the table. In other words, clubs with the largest fan bases generate 
positive externalities to clubs with smaller followings.  Therefore, 
the joint sale of broadcasting rights by the Club of 13 may benefit 
the competitive balance of the teams. Gerrard (2006) confirms this 
assumption by demonstrating that the concentration index is higher 
in countries opting for the individual sale of rights. 
Note that externalities are partially internalized by the major clubs. 
To the extent a substantial improvement in one club may reduce 
public interest in the competition, the marginal returns for signing 
top-flight players decreases. To be sure, internalization is far from 
complete and the interest of each individual club is to free-ride on 
the provision of the collective benefit of “competitive balance.”12 
But when clubs join in arrangements such as the “Club of 13,” free-
riding is mitigated, indicating that the arrangement brings potential 
efficiencies.13 
Joint sale also saves transaction costs compared to the alternative 
of individual negotiations with broadcasters. Club by club negotia-
tions raise questions as to how to define property rights when two 
12 Gratton and Solberg (2007) summarizes this conflict between individual and collective 
rationality of clubs: “whereas each club can maximize its attendances by maximizing the 
number of wins, the league as a whole may suffer by a reduced uncertainty of outcome....the 
uncertainty of outcome dimension represents a two-edged sword for teams and their suppor-
ters. Although both of them prefer to win, many find it boring if one or a few teams become too 
dominant”. The authors add that “the peculiar economics of professional sports” is such that 
clubs “have an interest in upholding the economic health of their rivals”.   
13 Gratton and Solberg (2007) recognize that it is possible to have other intruments than cen-
tralized negotiation to improve resource realocation among clubs. However, arrangements 
like the Club of 13 make it more feasible: “since the main purpose with agreeing collective sale 
procedures often is to redistribute income, the clubs involved in such deals are probably more 
willing to share income than clubs that negotiate their rights individually.”  
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clubs that have awarded their respective rights to different broad-
casters face each other. General rules like “the home team retains 
the property right” or “the game is subject to black out” may be 
defined prior to the season. Game by game negotiations are another 
possibility, leading to higher transaction costs. In any event, indivi-
dualized negotiations tend to hurt pay per view business, as today 
most viewers tend to purchase the option to select from all available 
games.14 
According to Gratton and Solberg (2007), in the UK, the Restricted 
Practice Court (RPC) accepted the collective negotiation, while, ho-
wever, finding that the deal fell within the definition of cartel beha-
vior, based on the redistribution toward small clubs. In Germany, 
the Bundesliga was also allowed to market broadcasting rights col-
lectively. In both cases, the EU required the association in charge 
of the broadcasting rights to split them up into packages. France 
attached so much importance to collective negotiations that they 
were mandated by law. 
The European Commission (EU) also recognized the potential vir-
tues of centralizing the negotiation of   broadcasting rights under 
one single entity within UEFA. Nevertheless, the EU also argued 
that the attendant virtues cancel out when the single entity sells all 
available rights to a single broadcaster for several consecutive ye-
ars as in Brazil. Thus, the centralized negotiations under one entity 
are only considered a problem when associated to an exclusive deal 
with a single broadcaster. To address the problem, the European 
Commission persuade UEFA to divide its key rights in two packages 
sold simultaneously, thereby allowing the league to preserve centra-
lized negotiations. 
On the other hand, in Italy, the Italian Competition Commission 
mandated that clubs sell broadcasting rights individually. Consistent 
14 Even considering that arrangements like the Club of 13 have the potential to redistribute 
resources among clubs,  coexistence among organizations is not always peaceful. Horowitz 
(1999) shows that two of the major   American college  football conferences, the Big Ten and 
the Pac Ten, formed a separate entity outside the scope of the NCAA (National Collegiate 
Athletic Association) and the CFA (College Footaball Association). The  primary complaint 
lodged by CFA members against the NCAA   was “their limited telecast-and-revenue oppor-
tunities.” The NCAA threatened CFA members with reprimand and expulsion. CADE’s 
case  did not involve boycott conduct  among clubs, but centered on whether centralized 
negotiations by clubs were unlawful. Following the settlement reached in Brazil, some clubs 
challenged the rules of the settlement and the Club of 13 ruling, opting for individual nego-
tiations, principally with Globo.   
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with the “redistribution of resources” and “free-rider” arguments, 
this policy increased inequality among teams. Juventus earned more 
than the bottom nine clubs, driving the smaller teams to threaten a 
boycott of the league. 
In Spain, Real Madrid and Barcelona negotiated their rights indi-
vidually, while the remaining 18 clubs negotiated collectively. The 
result is that the two biggest clubs earned about 37% of the total 
revenues collected by clubs. This stands in sharp contrast to the UK 
where collective negotiations restricted full take of the country’s 
two most important clubs, Manchester United and Arsenal to 15% 
of total revenues.
In view of this analysis, CADE did not challenge the Club of 13 
arrangement. 
5.  Segmenting Media Rights 
A key point of the SDE’s analysis is that the bundling of the five 
media platforms (free to air TV, pay TV, pay per view, mobile and 
Internet) favored Globo, as it represented the only broadcaster with 
operations on the five media platforms. The SDE stressed that bun-
dling would increase on barriers to entry in the market and recom-
mended unbundling of the five platforms. An example occurred in 
1997 when SBT bid higher than Globo, but was passed over by the 
Club of 13, because it only offered free-to-air TV services and lacked 
a pay TV package. In that same year the Club of 13 also excluded 
Band because the network’s   pay TV associate, TVA, was unable to 
provide pay per view at that time. 
On the other hand, in 2012 successful associations between free-to-
air broadcasters and other media platforms may be more likely than 
14 years ago when the lawsuit against Globo and the Club of 13 was 
filed. So, a free-to-air TV broadcaster lacking a pay TV arm can now 
link up with pay TV providers against broadcasters operating a more 
complete media package. In Brazil, a free-to-air TV broadcaster such 
as Record or SBT can team with pay TV channels, including ESPN, 
to bid for all TV rights. They can also consider partnerships with 
telecom operators ranging from Oi and, Vivo to Telefonica or even 
pure Internet providers such as UOL. 
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A recent example of a successful bidder without the full package of 
media platforms that was able nonetheless to secure the rights to the 
last Olympic Games was Record network. In fact, the International 
Olympic Committee was not interested in individual media bids, 
preferring to sell its broadcasting rights as a single media package 
to a free-to-air TV broadcaster, Record. Interestingly, Record subli-
censed the rights to pay TV and pay per view to Globo, the losing 
bidder.  In this light, the bundling of media   does not necessarily 
indicate a clear preference for broadcasters operating in all media 
segments. 
Again, it is important not only to address the anticompetitive impact 
of unbundling, but also how media unbundling  affects  the football 
broadcasting rights business. 
When a seller chooses between selling a given set of objects together 
or separately, he first considers whether the potential buyers have 
different valuations for those objects. If each object has a single 
potential buyer which attaches the greatest value to the object in 
question, a strategy of individualized sales may enhance the reve-
nues collected. In the case of soccer broadcasting rights, it is highly 
possible that the most efficient TV broadcasters are not the most 
efficient Internet providers. Similarly, both of these are not likely 
to be the most efficient providers of mobile platform football image 
services. 
Furthermore, media complement and substitute each other. In cases 
in which they are complementary, the value of a bundled subset of 
media is higher than the value of this subset sold separately. Two 
examples of complementarities are relevant: i) Revenue cannibaliza-
tion between media. When two or more media are acquired jointly, 
the winning bidder is able to internalize and minimize the negative 
externalities of one media over the other by enhancing their joint 
value; ii) Each viewer holds a different preference regarding distinct 
media. Different commentators in distinct media may be impor-
tant.15 Some viewers full match broadcasts on TV, particularly those 
involving the leading clubs. Other may merely only want to catch 
the highlights on the Internet, mobile devices, and TV media, inclu-
15 In Brazil, for instance, there are two types of viewers  in regard to their attitudes toward 
Globo’s lead football commentator and the one of the country’s most famous sports media 
personalities: a) the ones who love him; b) the ones who hate him, in what constitutes a typi-
cal horizontal differentiation. 
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ding after match times. When acquiring more than one media, the 
broadcaster is able to offer a more complete package of services to 
viewers, enhancing the value of the bundled media package. 
The principle of substitutability applies as well. As long as the ac-
cess to a broadcaster provided by the first media is relatively more 
important than subsequent media, each buyer will be willing to pay 
more for the first media and less for the others. However, as the 
broadcaster can allocate different games in each media, substituta-
bility may be significantly restricted, since each club’s fan base will 
be redirected to those media broadcasting their teams contest. 
It is quite difficult to address the relative importance of each factor 
in an optimum media fragmentation scenario. On one hand, each 
bidder has distinct valuations of individual media and that media 
substitutability pushes the optimum to media unbundling. On the 
other hand, midia complementarity drives the optimum toward me-
dia bundling. Competition policy also points to media unbundling 
as a means to facilitate entry into each platform, a factor that beco-
mes less important as associations between different media owners 
emerge. CADE s´ settlement with the Club of 13 on media unbun-
dling aimed to conciliate these effects. The Club of 13 undertook to 
permit bids for individual media. However, the Club of 13 was not 
prohibited from selling more than one media, including all five me-
dia, to the same bidder, depending on the value of the bids. Indeed, 
the Club of 13 was not even prohibited from accepting joint bids for 
more than one media, or a joint bid for all five media.16  
A potential critique is that unbundling without constraining the ca-
pacity to buy all media may generate the same outcome as allowing 
bundling all media for joint sale. The problem with imposing cons-
traints on the broacaster in buying all media, as in the UK case,17 is 
that once a bidder has bought the maximum allowed media, compe-
16 Assume that bidder A bids $ 1,000.00 for each one of the five media separately, generating 
$ 5,000.00 in revenues. Assume that bidder B makes a joint bid of $ 10,000.00 for all five 
media. If the Club of 13 accepts both the individual bids of A and the joint bids of B, it will 
be in a stronger position to grant broadcasting rights to B. On the other hand, if the sum of 
the individual bids, made by  up to a maximum of five bidders, amounts to, say, $ 12,000.00, 
the Club of 13  will prefer selling the respective rights to individual bidders. 
17 The UK offers an important example of constraint on the capacity of a single broadcaster 
to buy all packages/media. The Premier League selected six packages of rights and a “single 
buyer rule,” by which as given buyer could purchase no more than five packages, constituting 
a mild constraint. Bundled bids were also prohibited. 
Broadcasting Football Rights in Brazil                                                                                  353
Est. Econ., São Paulo, vol. 42, n.2, p. 337-362, abr.-jun. 2012
tition for the market in all remaining media is harmed. Worse yet, 
this could drive broadcasters to agree on the specific packages each 
one receive, substantially impacting competition for the market. 
6.  Auctioning Broadcast Football Rights
According to Gratton and Solberg (2007), the concession of exclusi-
vity rights in broadcast sports has been done more and more through 
auctions. This mechanism has   boosted revenues in sports. CADE’s 
agreement with the Club of 13 included a provision  requiring that 
the broadcasting rights for the BLC be awarded through a competiti-
ve bidding with clear and non-discriminatory rules, without binding 
the Club of 13 to any specific type of auction. 
One of the main objectives of auctions is to maximize revenues to 
the seller. Another key goals is to allocate the “object” to the bidder 
that attaches the most value to that object. Where the object of the 
auction is a business, as is the the case with broadcasting rights, bids 
are correlated to the expected profit of the bidder, which is also 
correlated to the value the bidder brings to society when running 
the business. When these correlations are close to “1,” the target 
of raising revenues in the auction and allocating the business to the 
bidder which attaches the greatest value to the business and offers 
added value to society will coincide in the auction mechanism. 
The problem is that those correlations are not always perfect. An 
auction based purely on the monetary value of bids may maximize 
auction revenues, but does not allocate the business to the bidder 
offering the greatest value to society. For instance, if the winner of 
the auction of a business is able to enhance its market power, the 
auction procedure is likely to maximizes revenues for the seller, but 
not contribute to the welfare of society. Indeed, the winner will 
include monopoly rents in its optimal bid, thus raising the bid. 
It is also possible that the seller could retain an interest in a given 
variable related to performance of the business. The bidder better 
suited to achieve the required performance may not accrue the hi-
ghest profits, and, as such, put forward the highest bid. Thus, the 
seller may wish to adapt the auction mechanism to this target. This 
may include performance targets related to a variable of interest in 
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return for a future commitment from the winner and/or as part of 
a set of award criteria. 
In the case of football broadcasting rights, clubs are interested in 
the capacity of broadcasters to keep and enhance the number of 
viewers. First, because they share the ex-post income from pay per 
view in Brazil (clubs will remain direct partners of the broadcaster 
in this case) and, second, because more fans watching games ensure 
football  and  each broadcast club’s “brand” remain highly valued. 
Enhancement of the brand carries value for clubs, as well as provi-
des a means to attract advertisers and, by extension, more fans and 
revenues. This is partially internalized in the bids, as more expec-
ted viewers increase the amount of money broadcasters are willing 
to spend on these rights. However, it is not fully internalized sin-
ce broadcasters and clubs contract independently with advertisers. 
Broadcasters simply do not internalize the income that clubs receive 
directly from their advertisers within their bids. In this light, clubs 
may be more interested in the number of viewers than broadcasters. 
Thus, it is possible that the winner of the auction, which is capable 
of paying the highest amount to the respective clubs may generate 
the most for clubs. 
It is important to consider whether specific broadcasters are better 
able to enhance the number of viewers compared to other broad-
casters. If viewers are more loyal to the program “football” than to 
the broadcaster, advertisers and clubs become more indifferent in 
regard to which broadcaster will be chosen. However, Globo argues 
that they “advertise games” throughout its programming grid. Since 
Globo has the highest average audience, it can attract more viewers 
than any other network, enhancing value for advertisers and clubs 
(and their own advertisers). So, what is relevant here is to ascertain 
whether football fans depend on TV advertising to get information 
and keep or enhance their interest on games. 
It is possible that the marginal impact of football on broadcast ear-
nings depends on the size and/or overall market share of the broad-
caster. If the inclusion of solid new programs have decreasing returns 
as the number of good programs grows, it is possible that   larger 
broadcasters will increase their audience by a smaller percentage 
than small broadcasters. This means that although larger broadcas-
ters can attract more audience than smaller broadcasters, the mar-
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ginal increase in audience share of the former is smaller than the 
latter. Therefore, broadcasting rights may be less valuable for a larger 
network than a smaller broadcaster in view of decreasing returns. 
The result is that when the award criteria is merely the highest 
money bid proposal, the winner may be a broadcaster that attracts 
less audience, decreasing the number of football viewers and the 
advertising income of clubs.   
In the UK, Gratton and Solberg (2006) consider the case of rugby. 
The transmission rights were transfered from the BBC to BskyB, 
after the broadcaster won the competitive bidding launched by the 
League. The problem was that BskyB proved less efficient in attrac-
ting audience share than the BBC, as reflected in the drop in average 
audience totals from 3 million to 150,000. When the contract with 
BskyB ended, the broadcasting rights for rugby reverted back to the 
BBC. 
Other issues like minimum quality requirements may be key to 
clubs’ interests and thus affect the optimum award criteria. Once 
more, the complexity of those issues made CADE unwilling to arbi-
trate the auction criteria, which was left to the Club of 13. The set-
tlement simply indicated the need of objective, clear and non-discri-
minatory rules. The terms of the settlement rendered the clubs free 
to include, for instance, audience targets in the auctioned contract 
and/or include these as part of the award criteria.18 This enabled 
the correction of non internalized externalities for auction procedu-
res based solely on monetary factors. According to Jeanrenaud and 
Késenne (2006), “the federations know – or ought to know – that it is 
in their interests to maintain a wide audience in order to guarantee 
the future popularity of the sports they represent. For this reason, 
rights do not always go to the highest bidder. This is illustrated by 
IOC s´ policy statement on this issue: “The fundamental IOC televi-
sion policy as set forth in the Olympic Charter is to ensure maximum 
presentation of the Olympic Games to the world. To ensure the wi-
dest possible television audience for the Olympic Games, Olympic 
18 The problem of including the variable of concern as a commitment established ex-ante or 
as part of the award criteria is that they may not be credible ex-post, a typical Williansom 
critique when there is asset specificity from both sides. The punishment for non-fulfillment 
of the commitments ex-post may not be feasible or be very costly. To avoid this problem, 
the seller may adopt rules of bidder eligibility based on some present observable variable, 
perhaps based on past performance, related to the variable of interest. In the case of bro-
adcasting rights, the Club of 13 could have used past audience performance as a means of 
defining rules of eligibility in the award criteria.  
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broadcast rights are sold to broadcast networks that can guarantee the 
broadest free-to-air coverage”. 
Through 2009, the auctions held by the Club of 13 were based on 
the highest offer. In 2011, the Club of 13 continued to base its award 
criteria on the highest financial bid. However, the Club of 13 ad-
ded a 10% advantage to Globo in view of the “Globo s´ support to 
Brazilian football over the past 25 years and the wide exposure the 
networks audience share offers club sponsors”. The question is whe-
ther this advantage fits the terms of the agrement with CADE. 
CADE was consulted by the Club of 13 before the competitive 
bidding procedure and argued that the 10% advantage would be 
discriminatory and an actual preference to Globo. Thus, the Club 
of 13 waived this advantage. The main problem is that the “10% 
Globo plus” was not based (at least explicitly) on any objective and 
observable criteria. However, the Club of 13 could have introduced 
an eligibility rule based on audience. However, if Globo were to 
fulfill the criteria, CADE would likely deem this discriminatory. 
The introduction of audience parameters based on quantitative evi-
dence in the award criteria jointly with the money paid could be an 
interesting approach to the challenges at hand mentioned above and 
contribute to fulfillment of the settlement requirements.
Another important problem concerning auction methodology in this 
sector is the winner s´ curse. Broadcasting rights offer substantial 
common values, since part of the value of this business is indepen-
dent of the individual characteristics of the bidders. The huge num-
ber of soccer fans in Brazil and the established tradition of Brazilians 
to watch broadcast games on TV is a common feature for all broad-
casters and do not depend on their specific efficiency at least in the 
short and medium run. Associating this common value characteristic 
to the fact that the incumbent, based on its historical experience 
in this market, may enjoy a significant information advantage over 
other broadcasters, the existence of a winner’s curse19 is plausible. 
By anticipating this, other bidders will be less aggressive in their 
bids. One alternative to mitigate this problem would be the inclu-
sion of revenue sharing agreements among clubs and the winning 
broadcasters,20 allowing for   better risk allocation among players. 
19 Gratton and Solberg (2006) believe that a winner’s curse occurred in many cases in Europe. 
One example  involved Canal Plus’s bid for the French League’s rights.
20 This may  result in a lower up front payment bid by broadcasters in the auction. 
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The revenue share could even become part of the award criteria. 
In Brazil, the contract in the pay per view midia already includes a 
revenue sharing clause.  
7.  Competition for the Market and Right of Preference
A preference clause seems to have helped Globo to maintain its 
status as the lone broadcaster of the BFL from 1997 to 2011. The 
preference clause is a typical English clause. Every bid made by 
a broadcaster to the clubs must be submitted to Globo. If Globo 
matches the bid within 30 days, it wins the contract.  This increases 
the probability of extending the three-year exclusivity term to six 
years, mitigating “competition for the market” in favor of Globo.
Therefore, as with the three-year exclusivity provided for in the 
broadcasting rights contract, the preference clause can have a posi-
tive impact on club revenues and the non-appropriable investments 
of broadcasters. In regard to club revenues, as long as the preference 
clause enhances the expected time of exclusivity, the value of the 
business will increase for the broadcaster, which will be more willing 
to pay for the broadcasting rights in the first place. We can say, the-
refore, that the preference clause has a “price.”
However, the positive effect of the preference clause on clubs seems 
to be weaker than the impact of the three-year exclusivity to the ex-
tent agents discount the future (beyond three years). In other words, 
the return on club revenues from increasing the exclusivity period 
decreases. Furthermore, since the result of the auction remains un-
certain, the preference clause may be priced less than would be a 
standard contract extension. 
There is a general tendency for the incumbent and the entrants to 
put forth lower bids in the presence of the preference clause. The 
beneficiary of the clause, Globo, has an incentive to submit a low 
initial bid, given that it will always have the opportunity to best the 
competition by triggering the preference clause. Theoretically, Globo 
could bid zero in the first auction round at no cost, knowing that it 
will have a second chance. So, while the preference clause may have 
boosted the bid offer in the first auction, it may well have reduced 
the final proposal in the following auction. The process constituted 
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a long/short run trade-off, with the “Club of 13” opting invariably 
in favor of the short run. 
The preference clause also creates a low incentive for competitors 
to make competitive bids, since they anticipate that Globo will have 
a chance to match their proposal, while they will be powerless to 
react. In short, they would be merely revealing strategic information 
as to the value of the respective rights. So, there is a strong tendency 
for all bidders, incumbent and entrants, to bid lower than they would 
if there were no preference clause. 
Considering the preference clause, the problem of the winner’s curse 
in the auction becomes more acute:  other bidders anticipate that if 
Globo does not use its preference ex-post, it is very likely that they 
will have overestimated the actual value of the rights and exagerated 
the bid amount. Unless the entrant bidder has a private value subs-
tantiallyn excess of the value of the incumbent (common and priva-
te) and is aware of it, a classical winner’s curse problem will emerge. 
Again, in anticipating this entrant bidders tend to be less aggressive 
in the bidding stage. The probability that an entrant will be success-
ful in the competitive bidding procedure, even if more efficient than 
the incumbent, is reduced with the preference clause. 
Therefore, the preference clause reduces the vigor of competition 
for the market, with three types of foregone benefits. First, if the 
most efficient player is no longer the incumbent, the preference 
clause reduces the likelihood that this most efficient player will win 
the auction in view of the winner’s curse and the incumbent’s infor-
mation advantage.21 This represents a potential loss of efficiency in 
the market. Second, as argued above, preference clauses may reduce 
expected revenues for clubs in auctions held following their adop-
tion, reducing their capacity and incentive to spur investments to 
enhance the event.   
Third, in the long run competition through innovation among broad-
casters can occur only if there is competition for the market. As long 
as preference clauses reduce the opportunities for entrants, the in-
centive to offer enhanced services at the time of contract shrinks. 
21 Preference clauses are better than longer exclusivity periods for competition since they po-
tentially, at least, provide for replacement of the incumbent when a very efficient entrant 
emerges. 
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All three inefficiencies are part of the objective function of the Club 
of 13. This association compares the costs against short-run gains on 
the first contract when the preference clause was priced and poten-
tial positive effects on broadcaster investments accounted for. 
There is a fourth inefficiency that is not part of the Club of 13’s 
objective function and may, as such, represent a gap between the 
private and the social objective function. By reducing the chance 
of alternative broadcasters, the preference clause extends the short 
run competition problems of exclusive deals in the broadcasting 
market over a longer time. As long as alternative broadcasters lack 
the opportunity to obtain rights, a three year lockout to this im-
portant input will extend to the long term. At the same time, as 
we saw above the positive impacts on the short-run revenues and 
investments of clubs tend to be lower than the effects of the three-
year exclusivity period.  
The bundling of media magnifies, further, the damage to compe-
tition for the market from the preference clause. Again, as long as 
the preference clause makes it more difficult for a relatively more 
efficient player in the provision of a single media platform to gain 
access, the efficient delivery of media will be jeopardized as well.  
Thus, the trade-offs involved in the preference clause more closely 
approximate those verified in the three-year exclusivity period. Yet, 
the cost-benefit analysis is more benign to the three-year exclusivity 
period (restraint of competition in the market) than the preference 
clause (restraint of competition for the market). The analysis sug-
gests that an intervention to suppress the preference clause may not 
be as damaging to the business model for soccer broadcasting rights 
than a direct ban on short run exclusivity.
By 2010, the Club of 13 began signaling to CADE and to the market 
that the preference clause was no longer a welcome provision, per-
haps indicating that the entity had become more forward looking. 
Although it is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for an anti-
trust intervention, the shift  revealed to CADE that an intervention 
capable of harming the BLC’s business model posed a smaller risk 
than in the past when the clause  represented a source of mutual 
interest  for Globo and the Club of 13. Therefore, while the Club of 
13 continues to tout the exclusive deal as a functional strategy for 
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the market’s business model, the same conclusion cannot be drawn 
from the preference clause. 
8. The 2011 Brazilian Football League Negotiation: Did the Set-
tlement Work? 
 The negotiations on the broadcasting rights to the BFL for the 2012 
– 2014 period were not launched until early 2011. Some of the le-
ading Club of 13 teams, including Corinthians, pressed the group 
to maintain its contract with Globo without a competitive bidding 
procedure. The main arguments for staying with Globo centered on 
the newtwork’s expertise and ability to attract larger audiences than 
any of the other broadcasters. 
The gridlock between the Club of 13 and a number of the major 
clubs triggered the group’s fragmentation and a series of individual 
negotiations with Globo. The Club of 13 insisted on the competitive 
bidding procedure and awarded the broadcasting rights to a smaller 
broadcaster, Rede TV. However, due to the decision of a majority of 
clubs to negotiate separately with Globo, the Club of 13 backed out 
of the contract with Rede TV!
Our view is that fragmentation does not represent the optimal 
outcome to provide efficiency to the market and the associated ar-
guments expounded in section IV. While smaller teams will likely 
pay a price, an extra transaction cost is sure to apply any time two 
clubs attached to different broadcasters face each other. 
The case offers an interesting antitrust issue. A set of bilateral nego-
tiation between Globo and Brazilian teams outside the framework 
of the Club of 13 circumvented, in practice, the settlement between 
CADE and the Club of 13. In short, the actions of a minority of 
clubs effectively doomed the settlement. The question is whether 
the separate negotiations entered into by individual clubs which ul-
timately undermined the settlement constitute an antitrust case. In 
fact, the fragmentation of   negotiation weakens the case for anti-
trust intervention, as each broadcaster will compete for the market 
“club by club.” A “club by club” competition for the market could 
generate competition in the market, resembling the SDE’s proposal 
to break the BFL’s stranglehold . Each broadcaster would define its 
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own standards of broadcasting, including technologies, commenta-
ry, press coverage and game schedules. Clubs would be more able 
to compare the services offered by different broadcasters, enabling 
more informed choices. Yet, ultimately the efficiencies afforded by 
exclusivity would be lost. 
Although circumvented by Brazilian clubs and Globo, the settlement 
had the virtue of shaking up the market. Two additional broadcas-
ters, Record and Rede TV!, expressed an interest in the business and 
began to submit offers to  individual teams. This could have changed 
the status quo of the negotiation in favor of clubs. 
The fact that the fragmented negotiating process ended with every 
club concluding a deal with a single broadcaster, Globo, seems to 
indicate a shared belief that Globo’s remains far ahead of its com-
petitors in regard to the efficiencies it offers, namely the capaci-
ty to attract audience share, offer quality TV broadcasts and ge-
nerate advertising revenues. However, Globo’s advantages could 
have been contemplated in the selection process by incorporating 
a score system, as proposed by Carrasco and Mello (2011). Under 
CADE’s settlement with the Club of 13, nothing precluded the 
Club of 13 from awarding scores to bidders based on the fulfillment 
of particular benchmarks.  In fact, CADE recognized that the cri-
teria for awarding of the contract should be left to the discretion of 
the Club of 13, including the application of quality requirements not 
captured in purely financial bids. That said, the Club of 13 preferred 
to consider only the highest financial bid.  
In sum, the perceived private cost of an antitrust intervention that 
reduces the likelihood of Globo emerging as the winner is high. 
Even when considered in the light of the soft approach adopted in 
the settlement with Globo and the Club of 13, particularly when 
compared to the more intrusive solution proposed by the SDE, it 
is possible that the sector is simpy not mature enough for an anti-
trust intervention, posing a serious risk of disruption to the Brazilian 
football business model and that of the Brazilian Football League, 
in particular.  
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